The outcry

“No, my lord,” Banks had replied, “no stranger has yet arrived. But I’ll see if any one has come in – or who has.” As he spoke, however, he observed Lady Sandgate’s approach to the hall by the entrance giving upon the great terrace, and addressed her on her passing the threshold. “Lord John, my lady.” With which, his duty majestically performed, he retired to the quarter – that of the main access to the spacious centre of the house – from which he had ushered the visitor. This personage, facing Lady Sandgate as she paused there a moment framed by the large doorway to the outer expanses, the small pinkish paper of a folded telegram in her hand, had partly before him, as an immediate effect, the high wide interior, still breathing the quiet air and the fair panelled security of the couple of hushed and stored centuries, in which certain of the reputed treasures of Dedborough Place beautifully disposed themselves; and then, through ample apertures and beyond the stately stone outworks of the great seated and supported house – uplifting terrace, balanced, balustraded steps and containing basins where splash and spray were at rest – all the rich composed extension of garden and lawn and park. An ancient, an assured elegance seemed to reign; pictures and preserved ‘pieces’, cabinets and tapestries, spoke, each for itself, of fine selection and high distinction; while the originals of the old portraits, in more or less deserved salience, hung over the happy scene as the sworn members of a great guild might have sat, on the beautiful April day, at one of their annual feasts. Such was the setting confirmed by generous time, but the handsome woman of considerably more than forty whose entrance had all but coincided with that of Lord John either belonged, for the eye, to no such complacent company or enjoyed a relation to it in which the odd twists and turns of history must have been more frequent than any dull avenue or easy sequence. Lady Sandgate was shiningly modern, and perhaps at no point more so than by the effect of her express repudiation of a mundane future certain to be more and more offensive to women of real quality and of formed taste. Clearly, at any rate, in her hands, the clue to the antique confidence had lost itself, and repose, however founded, had given way to curiosity – that is to speculation – however disguised. She might have consented, or even attained, to being but gracefully stupid, but she would presumably have confessed, if put on her trial for restlessness or for intelligence, that she was, after all, almost clever enough to be vulgar. Unmistakably, moreover, she had still, with her fine stature, her disciplined figure, her cherished complexion, her bright important hair, her kind bold eyes and her large constant smile, the degree of beauty that might pretend to put every other question by.
Lord John addressed her as with a significant manner.....

Ieri cu vedere spre Azi

"Fie că vrei lîngă Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza“ sau în Fundaţie, centrul Iaşiului îţi oferă cu greu un moment de răgaz în zilele noastre. Într-un trafic de cele mai multe ori aglomerat şi cu tineri din ce în ce mai zgomotoşi, istoria acestei zone – mult pomenită prin toate ghidurile turistice – pare mai degrabă să se ascundă printre teii imenşi, de teama agitaţiei şi a trecerii nemiloase a timpului. De îndată ce treci de Spitalul de Urgenţă şi sediul Academiei Române din Iaşi, strada Lascăr Catargi apare ca o adevărată oază de linişte şi istorie ce abia aşteaptă să fie descoperită. Numită pentru prima dată Uliţa Sturdzoaiei, aici se regăsesc numeroase vile şi case vechi aparţinînd clasei de mijloc a sfîrşitului de secol XX. Pînă la apariţia primelor construcţii pe actualul bulevard Carol I (cunoscut mai bine ca bulevardul Copou), această stradă era principalul loc de promenadă pentru ieşenii înstăriţi. Fastul vechii epoci se vede în continuare, Palatul Sturdza (sediul Radio România Iaşi), sediul TVR Iaşi, Institutul European sau clădirea unde a învăţat Emil Racoviţă duc mai departe istoria fostei capitale a Moldovei."..
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The Doctrine of Being

BEING is the notion implicit only : its special forms have the predicate 'is'; when they are distinguished they are each of them an 'other': and the shape which dialectic takes in them, i.e. their further specialisation, is a passing over into another. This further determination, or specialisation, is at once a forth-putting and in that way a disengaging of the notion implicit in being; and at the same time the withdrawing of
being inwards, its sinking deeper into itself. Thus the explication of the notion in the sphere of being does two things: it brings out the totality of being, and it abolishes the immediacy of being, or the form of being as such. 85. ] Being itself and the special sub-categories of it which follow, as well as those of logic in general, may be looked upon as definitions of the Absolute, or metaphysical definitions of God : at least the first and third category in every triad may,—the first, where the thought-form of the triad is formulated in its simplicity, and the third, being the return from differentiation to a simple self-reference. For a metaphysical definition of God is the expression of His nature in thoughts as such: and logic embraces all thoughts so long as they continue in the thought-form. The second sub-category in each triad, where the grade of thought is in its differentiation, gives, on the other hand, a definition of the finite. The objection to the form of definition is that it implies a something in the mind's eye on which these predicates may fasten. Thus even the Absolute (though it pur-ports to express God in the style and character of thought) in comparison with its predicate (which really and distinctly expresses in thought what the subject does not), is as yet only an inchoate pretended thought—the indeterminate subject of predicates yet to come. The thought, which is here the matter of sole importance, is contained only in the predicate : and hence the propositional form, like the said subject, viz. the Absolute, is a mere superfluity (cf. § 31, and below, on the Judgment). Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity, and measure. Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical, that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker. Measure, the third grade of being, which is the unity of the first two, is a qualitative quantity. All things have their measure : i. e. the quantitative terms of their existence, their being so or so great, does not matter within certain limits; but when these limits are exceeded by an additional more or less, the things cease to be what they were. From measure follows the advance to the second sub-division of the idea, Essence.

The three forms of being here mentioned, just because they are the first, are also the poorest, i. e. the most abstract. Immediate (sensible) consciousness, in so far as it simultaneously includes an intellectual element, is especially restricted to the abstract categories of quality and quantity.

Then and Now

[i]
Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.
[ii]
BIAGIO BUONACCORSI had had a busy day. He was tired, but being a man of methodical habit before going to bed made a note in his diary. It was brief: "The City sent a man to Imola to the Duke." Perhaps because he thought it of no importance he did not mention the man's name: it was Machiavelli. The Duke was Caesar Borgia.
It had been not only a busy day, but a long one, for Biagio had set forth from his house at dawn. With him on a stout pony went his nephew, Piero Giacomini, whom
Machiavelli had consented to take with him. It happened to be Piero's eighteenth birthday, October 6th, 1502, and so was a fitting day for him to go out into the world for the first time. He was a well-set-up youth, tall for his age and of an agreeable aspect. Under his uncle's guidance, for his mother was a widow, he had received a good education; he could write a good hand and turn a comely phrase not only in Italian, but in Latin. On the advice of Machiavelli, who passionately admired the ancient Romans, he had acquired more than a cursory knowledge of their history. Machiavelli cherished the conviction that men are always the same and have the same passions, so that when circumstances are similar the same causes must lead to the same effects; and thus, by bearing in mind how the Romans coped with a given situation men of a later day might conduct themselves with prudence and efficiency.
It was the wish both of Biagio and his sister that Piero should enter the government service in which Biagio held a modest post under his friend Machiavelli.
The mission on which Machiavelli was now going seemed a good opportunity for the boy to learn something of affairs, and Biagio knew that he could not have a better mentor. The matter had been settled on the spur of the moment, for it was only the day before that Machiavelli had been given his letter of credence to the Duke and his safe-conduct. Machiavelli was of an amiable disposition, a friend of his friends, and when Biagio asked him to take Piero with him immediately agreed. But the lad's mother, though she saw that it was a chance that could not be missed, was uneasy. He had never been parted from her before and he was young to go out into a hostile world; he was besides a good boy and she was afraid that Machiavelli would corrupt him, for it was notorious that Machiavelli was a gay fellow and a dissolute. He was, moreover, not in the least ashamed of it and would tell improper stories about
his adventures with women of the town and with maidservants at wayside inns which must bring a blush to a ....-

Russell's Paradox

Significance of the paradox
The significance of Russell's paradox can be seen once it is realized that, using classical logic, all sentences follow from a contradiction. For example, assuming both P and ~P, any arbitrary proposition, Q, can be proved as follows: from P we obtain P ∨ Q by the rule of Addition; then from P ∨ Q and ~P we obtain Q by the rule of Disjunctive Syllogism. Because of this, and because set theory underlies all branches of mathematics, many people began to worry that, if set theory was inconsistent, no mathematical proof could be trusted completely. Russell's paradox ultimately stems from the idea that any coherent condition may be used to determine a set. As a result, most attempts at resolving the paradox have concentrated on various ways of restricting the principles governing set existence found within naive set theory, particularly the so-called Comprehension (or Abstraction) axiom. This axiom in effect states that any propositional function, P(x), containing x as a free variable can be used to determine a set. In other words, corresponding to every propositional function, P(x), there will exist a set whose members are exactly those things, x, that have property P.[3] It is now generally, although not universally, agreed that such an axiom must either be abandoned or modified. Russell's own response to the paradox was his aptly named theory of types. Recognizing that self-reference lies at the heart of the paradox, Russell's basic idea is that we can avoid commitment to R (the set of all sets that are not members of themselves) by arranging all sentences (or, equivalently, all propositional functions) into a hierarchy. The lowest level of this hierarchy will consist of sentences about individuals. The next lowest level will consist of sentences about sets of individuals.

de la Goya la Picasso

"...Iniţiatorul expoziţiei şi-a dorit să ofere publicului viziunea pe care o au artiştii în privinţa răului, mai precis a crimelor şi a justiţiei. 450 de tablouri, documente şi alte diverse obiecte trasează, în consecinţă, istoria tumultoasă a acestui subiect, care i-a fascinat pe numeroşi pictori, de la Goya la Picasso, de la Théodor Géricault la Edgar Degas, de la Otto Dix la Magritte. Vizitatorii vor putea descoperi tablouri, ilustraţii, afişe şi desene mai puţin cunoscute... Cum ar fi o ilustraţie realizată de Toulouse-Lautrec şi intitulată La piciorul eşafodului, sau o alta realizată de scriitorul Victor Hugo şi care reprezintă un spînzurat. Publicul mai descoperă, de exemplu, că Edgard Degas, despre care credem uneori că a pictat numai suave balerine, este şi autorul unui tablou reprezentînd un viol.. Expoziţia de la Musée d'Orsay este de natură să ne dea frisoane pentru că evocă nu numai barbaria asasinului dar şi, într-un fel, cea a justiţiei... Aflăm, de exemplu, că de la Revoluţia franceză, mai bine zis din 1791, şi pînă în 1939 execuţiile capitale se făceau... în public. A urmat apoi, pînă în 1981, o perioadă mai "discretă", cînd condamnaţilor la moarte li se tăia capul în curtea închisorii, la răsăritul soarelui."
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De Spinoza (1632-1677)

iv. Causal Parallelism
An obvious question to ask at this point is whether it is possible for finite modes falling under one attribute to act upon and determine finite modes falling under another attribute. Spinoza’s answer is an unambiguous no. Causal relations exist only among modes falling under the same attribute. His explanation for this may be traced back to an axiom set forth at the beginning of Book One:
IA4: The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.
Given this axiom, if a finite mode falling under one attribute were to have God as its cause insofar as he is considered under a different attribute, i.e., if it were to be caused by a finite mode falling under a different attribute, then the knowledge of that mode would involve the knowledge of that other attribute. Since it does not, that mode cannot have God as its cause insofar as he is considered under some other attribute. In other words, it cannot be caused by a finite mode falling under some other attribute. When applied to modes falling under those attributes of which we have knowledge – thought and extension – this has an enormously important consequence. There can be no causal interaction between ideas and bodies. This does not mean that ideas and bodies are unrelated to one another. Indeed, it is one of the best-known theses in the Ethics that the lines of causation that run among them are strictly parallel: IIP7: The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. In the demonstration of this proposition Spinoza says that it is a consequence of IA4 and leaves it at that. Nevertheless, it is apparent that this proposition has deep foundations in his substance monism. As thought and extension are not attributes of distinct substances, so ideas and bodies are not modes of distinct substances. They are “one and the same thing, but expressed two ways” (IIP7S). If ideas and bodies are one and the same thing, however, their order and connection must be the same. The doctrine of substance monism in this way insures that ideas and bodies, though causally independent, are causally parallel.

The Logic of Hegel

PRELIMINARY NOTION.
LOGIC IS THE SCIENCE OF THE PURE IDEA; pure, that is, because the Idea is in the abstract medium of Thought. This definition, and the others which occur in these introductory outlines, are derived from a survey of the whole system, to which accordingly they are subsequent. The same remark applies to all prefatory notion what-ever about philosophy. Logic might have been defined as the science of thought, and of its laws and characteristic forms. But thought, as thought, constitutes only the general medium, or qualifying circumstance, which renders the Idea distinctively logical. If we identify the Idea with thought, thought must not be taken in the sense of a method or form, but in the sense of the self-developing totality of its laws and peculiar terms. These laws are the work of thought itself, and not a fact which it finds and must submit to. From different points of view, Logic is either the hardest or the easiest of the sciences. Logic is hard, because it has to deal not with perceptions, nor, like geometry, with abstract representations of the senses, but with pure abstractions; and because it demands a force and facility of withdrawing into pure thought, of keeping firm hold on it, and of moving in such an element. Logic is easy, because its facts are nothing but our own thought and its familiar forms or terms: and these are the acmè of simplicity, the a b c of everything else. They are also what we are best acquainted with : such as, 'Is' and 'Is not' : quality and magnitude : being potential and being actual : one, many, and so on. But such an acquaintance only adds to the difficulties of the study; for while, on the one hand, we naturally think it is not worth our trouble to occupy ourselves any longer with things so familiar, on the other hand, the problem is to become acquainted with them in a new way, quite opposite to that in which we know them already.
The utility of Logic is a matter which concerns its bearings upon the student, and the training it may give for other purposes. This logical training consists in the exercise in thinking which the student has to go through (this science is the thinking of thinking) : and in the fact that he stores his head with thoughts, in their native unalloyed character. It is true that Logic, being the absolute form of truth, and another name for the very truth itself, is something more than merely useful. Yet if what is noblest, most liberal and most independent is also most useful, Logic has some claim to the latter character. Its utility must then be estimated at another rate than exercise in thought for the sake of the exercise.
(I) The first question is: What is the object of our science ? The simplest and most intelligible answer to this question is that Truth is the object of Logic. Truth is a
noble word, and the thing is nobler still.....

Reviewing

1

IN London there are certain shop windows that always attract a crowd. The attraction is not in the finished article but in the worn-out garments that are having patches inserted in them. The crowd is watching the women at work. There they sit in the shop window putting invisible stitches into moth-eaten trousers. And this familiar sight may serve as illustration to the following paper. So our poets, playwrights and novelists sit in the shop window, doing their work under the curious eyes of reviewers. But the reviewers are not content, like the crowd in the street, to gaze in
silence; they comment aloud upon the size of the holes, upon the skill of the workers, and advise the public which of the goods in the shop window is the best worth buying. The purpose of this paper is to rouse discussion as to the value of the reviewer's office--to the writer, to the public, to the reviewer and to literature. But a reservation must first be made-by "the reviewer "is meant the reviewer of imaginative literature--poetry, drama, fiction; not the reviewer of history, politics, economics. His is a different office, and for reasons not to be discussed here he fulfils it in the main so adequately and indeed admirably that his value is not in question. Has the reviewer, then, of imaginative literature any value at the present time to the writer, to the public, to the reviewer and to literature? And, if so, what? And if not, how could his function be changed, and made profitable? Let us broach these involved and complicated questions by giving one quick glance at the history of reviewing, since it may help to define the nature of a review at the present moment.
Since the review came into existence with the newspaper, that history is a brief one.
Hamlet was not reviewed, nor Paradise Lost. Criticism there was but criticism conveyed by word of mouth, by the audience in the theatre, by fellow writers in taverns and private work-shops. Printed criticism came into existence, presumably in a crude and primitive form, in the seventeenth century.

The Poets and the Animals

IT IS AFTER ELEVEN. His mother has retired for the night, he and Norma are downstairs clearing up the children's mess. After that he still has a class to prepare. “Are you going to her seminar tomorrow?” asks Norma.
“I'll have to.”
“What is it on?”
“‘The Poets and the Animals.’ That's the title. The English Department is staging it. They are holding it in a seminar room, so I don't think they are expecting a big audience.”
“I'm glad it's on something she knows about. I find her philos-ophizing rather difficult to take.”
“Oh. What do you have in mind?”
“For instance what she was saying about human reason. Presumably she was trying to make a point about the nature of rational understanding. To say that rational accounts are merely a consequence of the structure of the human mind; that animals have their own accounts in accordance with the structure of their own minds, to which we don't have access because we don't share a language with them.”
“And what's wrong with that?”
“It's naive, John. It's the kind of easy, shallow relativism that impresses freshmen. Respect for everyone's worldview, the cow's worldview, the squirrel's worldview, and so forth. In the end it leads to total intellectual paralysis. You spend so much time respecting that you haven't time left to think.”
“Doesn't a squirrel have a worldview?”......

Ghosts

Mrs. Alving [bending over him]. It has been a dreadful fancy of yours, Oswald--nothing but a fancy. You have not been able to bear all this excitement. But now you shall have a long rest; at home with your own mother, my own blessed boy. Everything you point to you shall have, just as when you were a little child. There now! That crisis is over now. You see how easily it passed. Oh! I was sure it would----- And do you see, Oswald, what a lovely day we are going to have? Brilliant sunshine! Now you will really be able to see your home.
[She goes to the table and puts the lamp out. Sunrise. The glacier and the snow-peaks in the background glow in the morning light.]
Oswald [sits in the arm-chair with his back towards the landscape, without moving. Suddenly he says:] Mother, give me the sun.
Mrs. Alving [by the table, starts and looks at him.]. What do you say?
Oswald [repeats, in a dull toneless voice:] The sun. The sun.
Mrs. Alving [goes to him]. Oswald, what is the matter with you? [ Oswald seems to shrink together in the chair; all his muscles relax; his face is expressionless, his eyes have a glassy stare. MRS. ALVINGis quivering with terror]. What is this? [shrieks.] Oswald, what is the matter with you?
[Falls on her knees beside him and shakes him]. Oswald, Oswald! look at me! Don't you know me?
Oswald [tonelessly as before]. The sun. The sun.
Mrs. Alving [springs up in despair, intwines her hands in her hair and shrieks]. I can't bear it [whispers as though petrified] I can't bear it! Never! [Suddenly.] Where
has he got them? [Fumbles hastily in his breast.] Here! [Shrinks back a few steps and screams.] No, no, no! Yes!--No, no!
[She stands a few steps him with her hands twisted in her hair, and stares at him in speechless terror.]
Oswald [sits motionless as before and says:] The sun. The sun.

The Philosophers and the Animals

HE IS WAITING at the gate when her flight comes in. Two years have passed since he last saw his mother; despite himself, he is shocked at how she has aged. Her hair, which had had streaks of gray in it, is now entirely white; her shoulders stoop; her flesh has grown flabby. They have never been a demonstrative family. A hug, a few murmured words, and the business of greeting is done. In silence they follow the flow of travelers to the baggage hall, pick up her
suitcase, and set off on the ninety-minute drive.
“A long flight,” he remarks. “You must be exhausted.”
“Ready to sleep,” she says; and indeed, en route, she falls asleep briefly, her head slumped against the window.
At six o'clock, as it is growing dark, they pull up in front of his home in suburban Waltham. His wife Norma and the children appear on the porch. In a show of affection that must cost her a great deal, Norma holds her arms out wide and says, “Elizabeth!” The two women embrace; then the children, in their well- brought-up though more subdued fashion, follow suit. Elizabeth Costello the novelist will be staying with them for the three days of her visit to Appleton College. It is not a period he is looking forward to. His wife and his mother do not get on. It would be better were she to stay at a hotel, but he cannot bring himself to suggest that. Hostilities are renewed almost at once. Norma has prepared a light supper. His mother notices that only three places have been.....

Logic and philosophy

.. While logically proper names (words such as "this" or "that" which refer to sensations of which an agent is immediately aware) do have referents associated with them, descriptive phrases (such as "the smallest number less than pi") should be viewed as a collection of quantifiers (such as "all" and "some") and propositional functions (such as "x is a number"). As such, they are not to be viewed as referring terms but, rather, as "incomplete symbols." In other words, they should be viewed as symbols that take on meaning within appropriate contexts, but that are meaningless in isolation. Thus, in the sentence
(1) The present King of France is bald, the definite description "The present King of France" plays a role quite different from that of a proper name such as "Scott" in the sentence
(2) Scott is bald.
Letting K abbreviate the predicate "is a present King of France" and B abbreviate the predicate "is bald," Russell assigns sentence (1) the logical form
(1′) There is an x such that (i) Kx, (ii) for any y, if Ky then y=x, and (iii) Bx.
Alternatively, in the notation of the predicate calculus, we have
(1″) ∃x[(Kx & ∀y(Ky → y=x)) & Bx].
In contrast, by allowing s to abbreviate the name "Scott," Russell assigns sentence (2) the very different logical form
(2′) Bs.
This distinction between various logical forms allows Russell to explain three important puzzles. The first concerns the operation of the Law of Excluded Middle and how this law relates to denoting terms. According to one reading of the Law of Excluded Middle, it must be the case that either "The present King of France is bald" is true or "The present King of France is not bald" is true. But if so, both sentences appear to entail the existence of a present King of France, clearly an undesirable result. Russell's analysis shows how this conclusion can be avoided. By appealing to analysis (1′), it follows that there is a way to deny (1) without being committed to the existence of a present King of France, namely by accepting that "It is not the case that there exists a present King of France who is bald" is true.
The second puzzle concerns the Law of Identity as it operates in (so-called) opaque contexts. Even though "Scott is the author of Waverley" is true, it does not follow that the two referring terms "Scott" and "the author of Waverley" are interchangeable in every situation. Thus although "George IV wanted to know whether Scott was the the author of Waverley" is true, "George IV wanted to know whether Scott was Scott" is, presumably, false. Russell's distinction between the logical forms associated with the use of proper names and definite descriptions shows why this is so.
To see this we once again let s abbreviate the name "Scott." We also let w abbreviate "Waverley" and A abbreviate the two-place predicate "is the author of." It then follows that the sentence
(3) s=s is not at all equivalent to the sentence
(4) ∃x[Axw & ∀y(Ayw → y=x) & x=s].
The third puzzle relates to true negative existential claims, such as the claim "The golden mountain does not exist." Here, once again, by treating definite descriptions as having a logical form distinct from that of proper names, Russell is able to give an account of how a speaker may be committed to the truth of a negative existential without also being committed to the belief that the subject term has reference. That is, the claim that Scott does not exist is false since
(5) ~∃x(x=s) is self-contradictory. (After all, there must exist at least one thing that is identical to s since it is a logical truth that s is identical to itself!) In contrast, the claim that a golden mountain does not exist may be true since, assuming that G abbreviates the predicate "is golden" and M abbreviates the predicate "is a mountain," there is nothing contradictory about
(6) ~∃x(Gx & Mx).
Russell's emphasis upon logical analysis also had consequences for his metaphysics. ...

Determinism and Chaos

3.3 Determinism and Chaos
If the world were governed by strictly deterministic laws, might it still look as though indeterminism reigns? This is one of the difficult questions that chaos theory raises for the epistemology of determinism.
A deterministic chaotic system has, roughly speaking, two salient features: (i) the evolution of the system over a long time period effectively mimics a random or stochastic process—it lacks predictability or computability in some appropriate sense; (ii) two systems with nearly identical initial states will have radically divergent future developments, within a finite (and typically, short) timespan. We will use “randomness” to denote the first feature, and “sensitive dependence on initial conditions” (SDIC) for the latter. Definitions of chaos may focus on either or both of these properties; Batterman (1993) argues that only (ii) provides an appropriate basis for defining chaotic systems.
A simple and very important example of a chaotic system in both randomness and SDIC terms is the Newtonian dynamics of a pool table with a convex obstacle (or obstacles) (Sinai 1970 and others). See Figure ...

The story in it

The weather had turned so much worse that the rest of the day was certainly lost. The wind had risen and the storm gathered force; they gave from time to time a thump at the firm windows and dashed even against those protected by the verandah their vicious splotches of rain. Beyond the lawn, beyond the cliff, the great wet brush of the sky dipped deep into the sea. But the lawn, already vivid with the touch of May, showed a violence of watered green; the budding shrubs and trees repeated the note as they tossed their thick masses, and the cold, troubled light, filling the pretty drawing-room, marked the spring afternoon as sufficiently young. The two ladies seated there in silence could pursue without difficulty – as well as, clearly, without interruption – their respective tasks; a confidence expressed, when the noise of the wind allowed it to be heard, by the sharp scratch of Mrs Dyott’s pen at the table where she was busy with letters.
Her visitor, settled on a small sofa that, with a palm-tree, a screen, a stool, a stand, a bowl of flowers and three photographs in silver frames, had been arranged near the light wood-fire as a choice ‘corner’ – Maud Blessingbourne, her guest, turned audibly, though at intervals neither brief nor regular, the leaves of a book covered in lemon-coloured paper and not yet despoiled of a certain fresh crispness. This effect of the volume, for the eye, would have made it, as presumably the newest French novel – and evidently, from the attitude of the reader, ‘good’ – consort happily with the special tone of the room, a consistent air of selection and suppression, one of the finer aesthetic evolutions. If Mrs Dyott was fond of ancient French furniture, and distinctly difficult about it, her inmates could be fond – with whatever critical cocks of charming dark-braided heads over slender sloping shoulders – of modern French authors. Nothing had passed for half an hour – nothing, at least, to be exact, .............

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Mutaţii Rimbaldiene

......"Socialismul, spunea M.D., e o continuă dărîmare de statui": Carol I, Stalin, Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Roaită... "Adevărul umblă cu capul spart", iar "scriitorii sînt transferaţi la secţiile de cosmetică ale Puterii, întru împopoţonarea Urîtului, întru fardarea Minciunii, întru proslăvirea Mediocrităţii". Vîntul protocronismului "usucă tot ce întîlneşte în cale", în timp ce "biserici înălţate de domni pămînteni sînt făcute una cu pămîntul", scrie Dinescu în, repet, acelaşi martie '89. "Pseudonimul foamei se cheamă acum alimentaţie ştiinţifică şi raţională", într-un oraş şi într-o ţară în care "miliţienii sînt mai deşi ca porumbeii". "De 20 de ani încoace în ziarele noastre apar aceleaşi fotografii grosolan retuşate. Se zdrăngănesc aceleaşi deşelate fraze, singurul spaţiu cu adevărat viu fiind cel destinat anunţurilor mortuare". Totul vădeşte, s-ar putea conchide, cu vorbele lui Dinescu, "forţa şi superioritatea stîngii româneşti asupra dreptului roman"...
Expresivitatea şi vigoarea de-a dreptul cioraniene, în punctele de vîrf, ale acestor sintagme şi metafore de diagnostic politic (şi am luat doar cîteva mostre), din textele lui M. Dinescu (care nu e un filosof, are prea mulţi incuri pentru asta, însă are din plin darul verbului) mă îndeamnă să fac pe profetul în urbea mea şi să spun: Atenţie! Ochii pe Dinescu! Acest Gavroche al poeziei vecinie tînăr şi feroce, cu tropii săi de bună stîngă, care merge şnur şi la export, e, ţineţi minte ce va spun, tartor şi în proză, şi mult m-aş mira să nu vină tare, acuş-acuş, şi pe acest teren (că maidan nu pot să-i spun, ceva tot mişcă, vezi Dilema cu romanul).
Acum, că-i zi aniversară şi face o vîrstă pe jumătate rotundă, îi adresez de la această înaltă rubrică strămoşeasca urare: să trăieşti, bătrîne tînăr poet şi straşnic prozator latent, nu fi leneş şi nu te face că lucrezi, ci chiar lucrează, sapă, sapă, pînă dai iarăşi de apă. La mulţi ani şi să fim veseli, cum ne cere tovarăşul nostru Rabelais.
George PRUTEANU
Dilema, nr. 149, 17 nov. 1995

Autrui

."..Cependant, il est nécessaire d’établir une distinction entre autre et autrui. Disons simplement que si tout autrui est un autre, l’inverse n’est pas vrai. L’autre, ce peut être un autre homme mais ce peut-être aussi Dieu, un animal, voire un objet matériel tandis qu’autrui est toujours un individu humain. Plus encore, c’est cet individu humain envisagé comme alter ego. La question fondamentale qui est à la source de la problématisation d’autrui est la suivante : Comment se peut-il qu’existe un autre que moi que je découvre parmi les choses et qui pourtant, comme moi, est un ego (un sujet) ? Comment peut-il y avoir un ego qui ne soit pas mon ego. On ne doit pas se masquer les fondements d’une telle formulation de la question car celle-ci ne peut être posée ainsi que dans la mesure où le sujet est pensé comme point de départ absolu de la pensée philosophique. C’est parce qu’est mise en doute l’existence des choses qui me sont extérieures et que « je » suis la seule chose certaine qu’autrui devient un problème et ce d’autant plus que lui aussi doit être une chose pensante. C’est donc tout simplement parce qu’ils n’avaient pas pensé le sujet comme les classiques et les modernes, que les Grecs (et les médiévaux) ne pouvaient thématiser autrui. Mais ce n’est pas dire qu’ils concevaient uniquement l’autre comme une catégorie de la pensée ou une catégorie logique. Lorsque Platon se demande « Comment si le tout existe, chaque chose peut exister séparément ? », lorsque donc il pose la question de l’identité et de la différence, celle-ci a aussi immédiatement une portée morale et politique. Il en va de même pour Aristote lorsqu’il se demande si le rapport à autrui appartient à l’essence de l’homme ? La question de l’altérité entre les hommes se posait avant tout pour les Grecs dans les termes de la vie sociale et politique (cf. l’exemple classique de l’étranger, du non-Grec considéré comme « barbare »)". .......
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